This paper addresses a hazmat routing and scheduling problem for a general transportation network with multiple hazmat classes when incident probabilities are unknown or inaccurate. A multi-demon formulation is proposed for this purpose. This formulation is link-based (i.e., the decision variables are link flows) and can be transformed into other forms so that a wide range of solution methods can be used to obtain solutions. This paper also proposes a solution strategy to obtain route flow solutions without relying on exhaustive route enumeration and route generation heuristics. Examples are set up to illustrate the problem properties, the method of obtaining route flows from link flows, and the computational efficiency of the solution strategy. Moreover, a case study is used to illustrate our methodology for real-life hazmat shipment problems. From this case study, we obtain four key insights. First, to have the safest shipment of one type of hazmat, different trucks carrying the same type of hazmat need to take different routes and links. Second, in case of multiple-hazmat transportation, it is recommended to use different routes and links for the shipment of different hazmat types. This may increase travel time but can result in safer shipment. Third, if the degree of connectivity in a transportation network is high, the shipment company may have multiple solutions. Fourth, the hazmat flows on critical links (whose removal would make the network disconnected) must be distributed or scheduled over different periods to have safer shipment.
INTRODUCTION
According to US Department of Transportation (DOT), a hazardous material (or hazmat in short) is defined as any substance or material capable of causing harm to people, property, and the environment. Hazmats are classified into 9 classes according to their physical, chemical, and nuclear properties (Keller and Associates, 2001) . They are transported daily in many countries because the demand and supply locations are always different. The shipments of hazmats can be substantial. In some countries such as the USA, the volume and weight of hazmat shipments even increase over time. In 1998, 800,000 domestic daily shipments of hazmats were estimated to be transported in the USA whereas in 2009, the estimate increased to almost 1 million (US DOT, 2014) .
Given substantial shipments of hazmats, the related accidents do happen. Moreover, the accidents can occur anywhere along the trips, but these accidents only correspond to a small proportion of traffic accidents. The annual number of transportation accidents in the USA was about 6 million in 2008 (US DOT, 2008) in contrast to the approximately 20,340 hazmat transportation incidents in the same year (US DOT, 2009 ). According to the recent report of PHMSA (2014), between 2009 and 2013, the number of hazmat incidents increased by 3.8 percent. The number of hazmat incidents in a country is still miniscule compared to the number of road accidents currently. To get some ideas regarding the number of hazmat incidents in the US, interested readers may refer to (http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/library/data-stats/incidents). However, the total number of injuries and fatalities from each hazmat accident is drastically higher than that from a normal accident. Moreover, the release of these materials during transportation can be extremely undesirable as this can cause environmental pollution in addition to economic damage, injuries, and fatalities (Smith, 2009) . Meanwhile, many transportation companies in a country are in charge of hazmat shipments. These transportation companies need to consider safety and environmental issues and legal limitations to choose the best routes for their fleets but the regulations and constraints do not often apply to many non-hazmat trips with possible accidents. This is probably why the shipment of these hazardous materials has drawn considerable attention over the last few decades.
The traditional approach to modeling the routing and/or scheduling decisions assume that incident probabilities are known (e.g., Meng et al., 2005) . The alternative approach is that these probabilities are unknown. To deal with this assumption, non-cooperative game theory was often used in the literature (e.g., Bell, 2000 Bell, , 2003 Bell, , 2004 Bell and Cassir, 2002; Cassir et al., 2003; Szeto et al., 2006; Laporte et al., 2010; Qiao et al., 2014) . This theory was multiple hazmat vehicles, in which each individual vehicle may encounter an incident. This does not mean that the incident must be between two or more than two hazmat vehicles. Any incident in which a hazmat vehicle is involved is related to this research. This research also looks at the problem from the company's perspective while observing the country-wide restrictions and approved routes.
The problem is considered to be a non-cooperative game between multiple dispatchers and multiple demons on a space-time expanded network. A demon is an imaginary evil entity that intentionally attacks a link to cause explosion or an incident on the link when a hazmat vehicle is on the link. Each demon has enough knowledge on all links, leading to the most number of fatalities and injuries when a particular link is selected. Each demon must cause an incident on one and only one link. Each demon aims at seeking its link selection strategy to maximize the impacts of the incident. The game is non-cooperative between dispatchers and demons because the dispatchers and the demons make decisions independently. We assume that the shipment between an OD pair is responsible by just one private company, and a company cannot handle the shipment between more than one OD pair. Therefore, the game among dispatchers is also non-cooperative. However, this game can be easily extended to consider cooperation between dispatchers, which will be mentioned in the conclusion.
The problem is formulated by both route-and link-based approaches. The route-based approach develops the formulation with route flows as decision variables whereas the link-based approach develops the formulation with link flows as decision variables. The equivalence of the route-and link-based problems, in terms of the maximum expected payoff to each demon, is proved. Both problems are formulated as a mixed system of equations and inequalities. The link-based problem is also reformulated into a variational inequality problem (VIP), a nonlinear complementary problem (NCP), an unconstrained minimization problem (UMP), and a fixed point problem (FPP) to allow a wider range of solution methods developed for VIPs, NCPs, UMPs, and FPPs to solve the proposed linkbased problem.
Unlike solving the route-based problem, solving the link-based VIP, NCP, UMP, FPP, and mixed system of equations and inequalities do not require exhaustive route enumeration or route generation heuristics. However, the solutions to these formulations are link flows and link selection probabilities, which cannot tell the decision makers (or dispatchers) how to randomly select routes, departure times, intermediate stopping locations, and the corresponding stopping durations. This paper proposes a solution strategy, which is to firstly solve one of the linkbased formulations by existing solution methods and then deduce route flows from link flows by our proposed route flow extraction algorithm. The route flow extraction algorithm is proved to be convergent. An example is given to illustrate the algorithm. Numerical examples are also provided to illustrate the problem properties.
Problem insights and computational performance of the solution strategy are presented. Finally, a case study of Singapore is used to illustrate our proposed methodology for real-life hazmat shipment problems. The contribution of this paper includes the following: (i) This paper proposes link-based models to determine the routes and schedules of hazmat shipment under the situation of unknown incident probabilities, (ii) it introduces a solution strategy to obtain solutions on exhaustive route enumeration and route generation heuristics, and (iii) it presents the problem properties and problem insights.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature of the subject. Section 3 presents the models and discusses their properties. Section 4 depicts the proposed solution strategy. Section 5 presents a numerical study. Section 6 focuses on algorithm complexity and computational results. Section 7 highlights the practical aspects of the formulated problem using a case study. Section 8 concludes the paper and provides some future research directions.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Several streams of research are related to our work. Therefore, the literature is organized in terms of these streams as follows:
Hazmat routing and scheduling with known incident probabilities: To mitigate the level of the risk involved in hazmat transportation, a lot of research was done in the past. Comprehensive review papers on this research area can be found in List et al. (1991) , Erkut and Verter (1995) , Erkut and Verter (1998) , and Verter and Kara (2008) .
As appropriate hazmat routing and scheduling decisions can reduce the level of the risk involved, most previous hazmat shipment studies focus on the planning of (1) routes (e.g., Batta and Chiu, 1988; Gopalan et al., 1990; Jin et al., 1996; Chang et al., 2005; Akgün et al., 2007; Carotenuto et al., 2007; Kang et al., 2014) , (2) schedules (e.g., Cox and Turnquist, 1986) , and (3) both routes and schedules simultaneously (e.g., Zografos and Androutsopoulos, 2004; Meng et al., 2005) . These studies assumed that link incident probabilities were known. For the lowprobability events like incidents involving hazardous materials, these probabilities are usually unknown, because these events are rare and there is often insufficient data to estimate these probabilities (Bell, 2006) . Over the time that it would take to accumulate adequate data to estimate the probabilities, circumstances may have changed (say, accident black spots may have been treated), making the calculated probabilities obsolete (Bell, 2006) . Moreover, most dispatchers, when dealing with high-consequence events, exhibit risk aversion (Bell, 2006) . This leads to one line of research given in the next subsection.
Hazmat transportation with unknown incident probabilities: To deal with unknown incident probabilities and risk aversion behaviors of dispatchers, the non-cooperative game approach was used in modeling hazmat routing (e.g., Bell, 2006 Bell, , 2007 . In particular, Bell (2006) proposed a minimax formulation to determine the safest set of routes and the safest share of traffic among these routes for hazmat shipment. This formulation has a game theory interpretation and can be considered a non-cooperative, zero-sum game between a dispatcher seeking the set of routes that minimize the expected population affected and a demon seeking to maximize the expected population affected by causing an incident on one link. Bell (2007) further considered the travel cost in the minimax formulation. Bell (2006 Bell ( , 2007 only considered route planning. In fact, incorporating scheduling decisions for hazmat shipment can further reduce the level of the risk involved (Nozick et al., 1997) . Szeto (2013) further considered scheduling decisions. However, Bell (2006 Bell ( , 2007 and Szeto (2013) considered each origin-destination (OD) separately. In reality, there is interaction of hazmat shipment between OD pairs. Two or more hazmat shipments of the same class or different classes can use the same road section and have an incident at the same time.
The impact of the incident can affect more people around the incident location compared with the incident due to only single class of hazmats because of the reaction between different classes of hazmats or a higher volume of hazmats involved. It is therefore important to model multiple OD pairs and multiple classes of hazmats. In this paper, we potentially "allow" several hazmat shipments of the same class or different classes using the same road section and having an incident simultaneously. However, this does not mean that several hazmat shipments must use the same road section. On the contrary, usually the model chooses different routes for different hazmat classes to avoid having large flows and consequently large possible accidents, injuries, and fatalities. In practice, the approved hazmat routes (inputs of our model and also shipping companies) in various countries are always the same for different classes of hazmat shipments. However, for any reason, if a specific hazmat shipment cannot use a link, we can implement this constraint to our model by setting the flow on the forbidden link equal to zero. Of course, this can reduce our solution search space, which is a positive point for models that contain integer variables (because it usually reduces computational efforts).
Time-dependent hazmat routing and scheduling: Another line of research is time-dependent hazmat routing and scheduling, in which link travel times are time-varying. In this context, Haghani and Chen (2003) assumed that travel times over links could vary by time of day; they considered risks on routes, risks at nodes, and travel times and mathematically formulated the problem. In our research, we also consider that travel times can vary by time of day but our focus is more on reducing the number of affected people in case of emergency rather than explicitly minimizing travel time. Meanwhile, spreading risks in both time and space for time-dependent networks was suggested by Bersani et al. (2010) . Toumazis (2012) and Toumazis and Kwon (2013) used the concept of conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) for mitigating hazmat transportation risks in a time-dependent network and tested the idea on the road network of Buffalo's, NY. Androutsopoulos and Zografos (2010) addressed a hazmat routingscheduling problem, in which the two criteria, cost and risk, are time-dependent. Androutsopoulos and Zografos (2012) also considered dynamic travel times in a city network for their hazmat routing and scheduling problem and formulated it as a bi-objective problem. Similarly, we also consider that hazmat incident risk changes over time.
Unlike the abovementioned research studies, we do not exploit a bi-criteria method to include both criteria. On the contrary, similar to the concept of lexicographic method, we apply travel time (not travel cost) and risk sequentially. To be more specific, we implicitly consider travel time to create the transportation network; after that we inject the element of time/scheduling to the network to spread potential hazmat explosion risk over time.
Although we are also interested in shortest travel distance/time, the most important criterion in our hazmat routing problem is to use the safest set of routes. Therefore, instead of considering the only shortest route between any OD pair, we are interested in considering several (i.e., more than one) routes that are short/fast enough to allow us split the hazmat incident risk among them.
Security considerations in hazmat routing and scheduling: Huang et al. (2003) believed that routing hazmat vehicles should not only ensure the safety of travellers but also consider the risk of the hazmat being used as a mass destruction weapon. They evaluated the risk of hazmat transportation by integrating geographic information systems (GIS) and the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) to determine the weights of various criteria of the alternative routes. Huang et al. (2004) used a set of evaluation criteria in hazmat routing with the special focus on criteria related to security. Both of these methods were tested on a case study in Singapore. DeLorenzo et al. (2005) described a real-life project related to the benefits of wireless communications systems with GPS technology in enhancing the safety, security, and efficiency of hazmat transportation. Security and safety in hazmat routing is not only limited to road transportation mode. For example, Gordon and Young (2015) focused on hazmat trains to address the rules regulating the movement and handling of hazmats and explore the security of how the train hazmat routing information can be safeguarded while ensuring that first responders and affected communities have what is needed to address the risks and be able to effectively respond to incidents. In our research, we also consider a risk-averse strategy with the special focus on spreading risks in both space and time. Unlike Huang et al. (2003) who used a multi-attribute technique, we exploit a non-cooperative game theoretic approach. Moreover, Huang et al. (2004) used a meta-heuristic technique to solve their problem while we analytically model and solve our problem.
Demon, covert attacks, and hazmat transportation: In this research, our game theoretic approach is based on imaginary demons playing the role of attackers. In game theory, there is a big difference between games between intelligent opponents and games against nature. The latter does not exclude win-win solutions but the former excludes these solutions. Imaginary demons in our game theoretic approach are responsible for implementing covert attacks, which is based on the worst-case situation in high-consequence-low-probability events in case of lack of sufficient historical data. In the literature, few scholars exploit such concept to connect hazmat and covert attacks. For instance, Yates (2008) introduced mathematical models based on the hypercube spatial queuing model for locating sensors within a large geographic region to detect covert attacks using hazmat vehicles; the models were tested on a case study within the region of Los Angeles County, California. Yates et al. (2011) considered two aspects in the protection of infrastructures from covert attacks: i) the optimal location of sensors to detect vehicles posing potential threats and ii) the sizing of the interception team and the placement of these resources on the network. investigated how GIS can assist in a critical infrastructure protection problem.
They considered a region, in which an attacker plans to attack multiple targets; the model helps the defender analyse the resource allocation strategy in the network. examined this resource allocation problem in an urban environment using a bi-level mixed integer and hypercube queuing model. In our paper, some imaginary demons may be considered to be those exploding the hazmat consignments or causing accidents; the number of demons is considered a known input. The more risk averse the model user is, the more number of demons are used in modeling. The model is developed based on a zero-sum game to exclude win-win situations.
Acyclic networks in hazmat routing:
The hazmat routing scheduling problem in this research is based on acyclic networks. The requirement of acyclic network may seem restrictive. In the literature, many scholars including Klein (1991) , Nozick et al. (1997) , Meng et al. (2005) , Bell (2006) , and Szeto (2013) explicitly considered acyclic networks to model and solve such problems. While considering acyclic networks is one of our basic assumptions, our solution procedure proposed in the later part of this paper (which is used to deduce route flows from link flows) is not started with an acyclic network but we convert it to acyclic using a conversion that was originally designed for the connectivity test in the graph theory context. This conversion implicitly and partially applies the shortest travel distance criterion not allowing a hazmat vehicle to travel on a cycle going back to a node that has already been visited. To sum up, we can use a cyclic diagraph as an input to the solution procedure but convert it to an acyclic network.
FORMULATIONS
In the section, we first define the concept of Space-Time Expanded Network (STEN) that helps us to formulate the study problem as a mixed system of equations and inequalities using route-and link-based approaches. We then prove the equivalent between route-and link-based problem, followed by the reformulation of the link-based mixed system of equations and inequalities into a VIP, an NCP, a UMP, and a FPP, and the discussion on their problem properties. The notations for the formulations are given in Table A 1 T  ) with one origin and destination, which represents the pure routing problem with single OD pair as discussed in Bell (2006) . In this case, the two dummy links can be removed.
The expanded network in this paper differs from the classical space-time network like the one in Yang and Meng (1998) as follows:
1. Travel links in this paper are horizontal whereas they are inclined in the classical space-time expanded network, because unlike the classical space-time expanded network, travel time is not explicitly considered in our network. In the later sections, using the concept of minimum spanning tree, we consider travel time in the expanded network prior to solving the hazmat routing-scheduling problem. However, we can easily modify the expanded network to incorporate travel time by assuming all travel links having the same travel time and by adding more nodes and travel links in the resulting network.
2. There is no queuing link in the expanded network. Waiting links can be considered to be queuing links but we do not use queuing theory techniques because the number of shipments/trucks dispatched by the shipment company compared with all other types of vehicles on a road transportation network is very small. Additionally, the problem is solved at the tactical level but queue length can be considered an operational issue.
An example of a base network with two OD pairs is given in Figure 1 . The corresponding STEN considering two departure time choices (one for the daytime, one for the night time) is given in Figure 2 , where the solid, dashed, and dash-dotted arrows represent travel, dummy, and waiting links, respectively. For the ease of reference, 
Route-based Formulation
The proposed integrated routing and scheduling problem involves three definitions: loss, expected loss, and total expected loss. Loss (expected loss) is defined as the number (expected number) of people affected in the event of accidents. Expected loss can be defined on the link, route, and network levels. The expected loss on a link (route) is the expected number of people affected in the events of accidents on that link (route). The sum of the expected loss on all links or routes gives the total expected loss. With these definitions, the proposed problem can be modeled as a non-cooperative game with two sub-problems, namely demon and dispatcher subproblems.
The Demon Subproblem
This subproblem has M demons. The number of demons M is a proxy of how risk averse a decision maker (e.g., a transport planner or a traffic manager) is. A more risk-averse decision maker can set a larger number of demons.
Each demon is an imaginary evil entity that intentionally attacks a link to cause explosion on the link when a hazmat vehicle is on the link. Each demon has enough knowledge on all links, leading to the most number of fatalities and injuries when a particular link is selected. Each demon must cause an incident on one and only one link in the STEN. Two or more demons can cause incidents on the same link in the STEN. Therefore, each demon has A choices, and M A link selection combinations or scenarios are possible. Each demon aims at seeking its link selection strategy to maximize its expected pay-off which numerically equals total expected loss. The expected payoff P can be mathematically formulated as follows:
where k u is the probability of scenario k .
The scenario probability k u is determined by the link selection strategy. 
In (1)   between periods t and 1 t  in scenario k . The population density of a node may be different from period t to t + 1. That is why we consider the time average loss at the node between periods t and t + 1. The time average concept should also be applied to a travel link when the change in population density is relatively large over the time spent on that link. We can set the damage equal to zero if the vehicle is waiting in a safe location where it is sufficiently far away from residential areas. Alternatively, without loss of generality, we can consider the loss on the waiting link as the maximum loss at the node between periods t and t + 1.
By substituting (2) into (1), the payoff to each demon can then be written as follows:
Based on the above condition, we can derive the derivative t m l dP dp
which can be interpreted as the expected payoff to demon m when demon m causes an incident on link '
be the maximum expected payoff to demon m . The first-order Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of the non-cooperative, link selection strategy game for the demon subproblem can then be written as the following nonlinear complementarity conditions:
0, 1,..., , 1,..., ' 
is the probability of t a selected by at least one demon excluding demon m.
By the definition that each demon must cause an incident on one and only one link in the STEN, the link selection probability t m l p must satisfy
The Dispatcher Subproblem
The dispatcher problem can be viewed as a non-cooperative game between n dispatchers in which each dispatcher is responsible for sending vehicles to transport one class of hazmats between an OD pair. Each dispatcher aims to select a route selection strategy in the STEN (which incorporates departure time choice, waiting time, and location choice in addition to route choice) to minimize his or her expected loss. The expected loss to each dispatcher can be expressed as 
These conditions imply that if dispatcher q rs selects j for shipment, the expected loss to the dispatcher must equal its minimum expected loss, and not be greater than the expected loss when the dispatcher selects any other routes.
In conditions (13)- (15) 
, , 
The Proposed Integrated Routing and Scheduling Problem
The proposed integrated routing and scheduling problem is to find Their proofs are given in the Appendix.
Basic Link-Based Formulation
The route selection probabilities obtained from the route-based formulation can also give useful information to dispatchers such as how to choose routes, departure times, intermediate stopping locations, and the stopping duration to transport hazmats. However, the route-based formulation explicitly requires a complete route set for each dispatcher in the dispatcher subproblem. This requirement is not attractive for large networks because it requires either 1) exhaustive and time-consuming route enumeration to generate a complete route set during solution process in order to ensure convergence but the route set can be very large even for a medium network or 2) a column generation heuristic to determine a smaller route set to solve the route-based problem but the convergence is not guaranteed. Therefore, the dispatcher problem is reformulated via the link-based approach.
We reformulate equations (16) 
0, , , (10), (18)- (23) 
is equivalent to the route-based problem (1)-(18).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Alternative Link-Based Formulations and Solution Properties
The link-based problem (1)- (10), (18)- (23) 
, , , (4) and (20), respectively.
Proposition 5: The NCP (24)-(27) is equivalent to the link-based problem (1)-(10), (18)-(23).
The proof is given in the Appendix. The above proposition implies that solving the NCP (24)- (27) is equivalent to solving the link-based problem (1)-(10), (18)-(23). Hence, the existing solution methods for NCPs can be used for obtaining solutions to the link-based problem.
Unconstrained Minimization Problem Formulation
The NCP (24)-(27) can also be transformed to a UMP: (25)- (28) is zero.
Proof:
The sum of squares must be non-negative so the minimum objective value is zero.
Proposition 7: The UMP (25)-(28) is equivalent to the NCP (24)-(27) and hence the link-based problem (1)-(10), (18)-(23).
Proof: See the Appendix. (25)- (28) and hence the link-based problem (1)- (10), (18)- (23). Furthermore, if a local optimization method is used, we need to ensure whether the objective value is zero. If not, another initial solution should be used until a zero objective value is achieved.
Variational Inequality Problem Formulation
The NCP (24)- (27) is equivalent to the following VIP. Find
where y and   H y are defined by conditions (25)- (27);
Proposition 9:
The VIP (25)- (27), (29) is equivalent to the NCP (24)- (27) and the link-based problem (1)- (10), (18)- (23).
Proof: This follows directly from Proposition 1.4 in Nagurney (1999) and Proposition 5.
Proposition 10: A solution exists to the VIP (25)-(27), (29) and the link-based problem (1)-(10), (18)-(23).
The above two propositions imply that a solution exists to the proposed route-based problem (1)- (18) and the NCP (24)- (27). The solution is a Nash equilibrium one. Because the mapping function   H y is not strictly monotone in general, solution uniqueness is not guaranteed.
Fixed Point Formulation
The VIP (25)- (27), (29) 
  , then the FPP (30) and the VIP (25)-(27),(29) have the same set of solutions.
Proof: This follows directly from Proposition 1.3 in Nagurney (1999) and Proposition 9.
SOLUTION APPROACHES TO LINK-BASED FORMULATIONS
This paper proposes to firstly solve one of the link-based formulations by existing solution methods and then deduce route flows from link flows by our proposed route flow extraction algorithm. This leads to two approaches: 1) One method is to solve one of the alterative link-based formulations in section 3.4 to firstly obtain 
Route-Flow Extraction Algorithm
The route-flow extraction algorithm can be used in any The detailed algorithmic procedure is as follows:
Step 0:
Select an OD pair and a hazmat class.
Step 1: Set j = 0 and
Step 2: If q t rs a v on all dummy links emanating from r equal zero, go to Step 9.
Step 3:
Set the current node to be r .
Step 4:
Set j = j + 1,rs rs j h d  , and the list R j containing the links composing the current route j to be empty.
Step Step 8: Set the current node to be the exit node of link t a . Go to Step 5.
Step 9: Repeat Steps 0-8 until all classes of hazmats for all OD pairs are selected.
In Steps 4 and 6 of the developed algorithm, the link selection rule determines the final used route set for a given class of hazmats' route flows between the subject OD pair. If the link selection rule is random, for each execution, the procedure can generate different used route sets and also different route flows from the same set of initial link flows. However, if the selection rule is deterministic and according to a specific principle, there is a oneto-one relationship between the given link flows and the resultant route flows. The selection rule can be based on the largest link flows, the alphabetical order of links, or a combination of them.
The time complexity is ( | |) O nT N , where (| |)
O N is the time complexity of one route building iteration. One route-building iteration is defined by Steps 5-8, the steps for building a route from dummy origin r to dummy destination s . During a route-building iteration, the following two cases cannot be happened: 1) At an intermediate node, no link is available for selection, and 2) the same node is visited more than one. As vertex conservation is ensured throughout the algorithm (by Step 5 and the initial link flows), once a link except the dummy link connected to s is selected, at least one link with non-zero flow is available for selection during a route-building iteration. Moreover, acyclic graphs rule out the case of visiting a node more than once within one iteration. Hence, a route must be able to be built within each route-building iteration.
According to time complexity ( | |)
O nT N , it is clear that more time periods in the time span (i.e., larger T value), more nodes in the STEN, and more number of dispatchers lead to longer computation time.
Recursive dynamic algorithm
One of the issues in solving the mixed system of equations and inequalities is the calculation of 
This is for the arcs directly outgoing from r (the only dummy origin). Naturally, the lowest expected losses for the arcs coming out of the dummy origin (which are actually dummy links) is zero. Then, the following recursive equations can be utilized:
It is similar to Dijkstra's Algorithm and takes O( 2 | | N  ) time. The equations (31)-(32) will be used in section 6.1 to solve our real-life case problem.
NUMERICAL STUDY
To illustrate the route-flow extraction algorithm and properties of the problem, numerical studies are carried out. In these studies, the network adopted is the one described in section 2 (see Figure 2) . Four classes of hazmat flows are considered: Class-1 and -2 hazmat flows between OD pair (1,3), and Class-1 and -3 hazmat flows between OD pair (2,3). They are allowed to use any link with the following exceptions: Class-3 hazmat flow is not allowed to pass through link 2 whereas class-1 and -2 hazmat flows are not allowed to pass through link 3. The parameters adopted in these studies are as follows: Tables 1-3 show the results for all the three cases. One can easily verify that for each case, the result satisfies flow conservation at each node, the first-order optimality conditions for the demon and dispatcher subproblems, and the definitional constraint for link selection probabilities. For example, in Table 1 , the sum of class-1 flows on links 6 1 and 6 2 equals the demand of 100 vph. In Table 2 , we can see that when the demon selects a link to cause an incident with some probability, the corresponding payoff must be the largest. Moreover, the selected link must have a non-zero expected loss as shown in Table 1 , which equals the difference between the lowest expected losses at the entry and exit nodes of that link. For instance, the lowest expected loss at the entry and exit nodes of link 2 1 are, respectively, 0 and 1562.5 according to Table 3 . Their difference equals the expected loss on link 2 1 as shown in Table 1 . Furthermore, from Table 2 , we can see that the sum of link selection probabilities of a demon equals one.
In addition, according to Table 2 , even though we allow two or more demons selecting the same link for causing incidents on it, in the solution, such case will not happen, because the loss associated with a link due to multiple attacks by different demons is set to be the same as the loss due to single attack by one demon. Table 2 . Link selection probability and payoff. Expected losses on dummy links are zero (see Table 1 ) as the loss is assumed to be zero on each of these links.
These links must not be selected by demons as selecting these links would not increase their payoffs. When the number of demons is greater than 1, the maximum payoff to each demon is the same as shown in Table 2 , which agrees with Proposition 1. The number of links selected by demons is non-decreasing with the number of demons adding to the network as reflected in Table 2 . When M equals 1 or 2, the number of links selected is two. When M =3, the number of links selected is four. The reason is also follows. According to the base network, link 2 is the only route to destination 3 for flows from node 1, and is used by most classes of hazmats (or by class-1 and -3).
Therefore, links 2 1 and 2 2 must be selected when M =1. When one more demon is introduced (i.e., M =2), both links are selected with certainty so as to maximize the payoff to each of the two demons and therefore the number of link Although the number of links selected can remain unchanged after introducing one more demon, the expected payoff must be increased. Indeed, from Table 2 , we can observe that the maximum expected payoff increases with the number of demons involved. This is expected as more incidents can be occurred in the network. This raises the question of how many demons should be introduced to the network. The number of demons is actually a proxy of the maximum number of simultaneous incidents associated with hazmat shipment in the network. A more riskaverse decision maker can use a larger number of demons. Without a deep analysis to this question, we suggest using a maximum historical number. According to Incident Reports Database Search of PHMSA (Office of Hazardous Materials Safety) (https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/IncrSearch.aspx), it is not very likely to have more than two hazmat incidents simultaneously. Therefore, considering a maximum of two demons is sufficient for the purposes of planning the worst case situation. Table 3 also illustrates the effect of route sets on the lowest expected loss. According to Table 3 , for OD pair (2,3), the lowest expected costs for class-1 and -3 hazmats from dummy node 2' to node 3 1 are different. This is because links 3 1 and 3 2 are not allowed to be used by class-1 and -3 hazmats. Should one of the two classes were allowed to use these links, the lowest expected cost for class-1 (class-3) hazmats would increase (decrease) but the lowest expected costs of the two classes from dummy node 2' to node 3 1 would be the same. The same argument applies at node 3 2 and dummy node 3'.
The solutions given in Tables 1-3 are not the only solutions to the link-based problem. Solutions to the problem are not unique in terms of link selection probabilities, link flows, and maximum expected payoffs. For simplicity, we consider M = 2. The two demons exchange their selections but the link flows follow those in Table 1 . The new maximum expected payoff for each demon is still 6250. Alternatively, we can obtain the same maximum expected payoff under the link selection probabilities described by Table 2 if the flows on links 1 2 and 6 2 are all reduced by one unit and the flows on links 1 1 , 5 1 , and 6 1 all increase by one unit. This is because those links are the low impact links and must not be selected by demons, leading to zero expected losses on these links before and after flow adjustment. The third example for M =2 is that both demons 1 and 2 selects both links 2 1 and 2 2 with equal probability but the link flows follow the ones in Table 1 . In this situation, the maximum payoff is reduced to 4687.5.
This suboptimal result is due to the lack of coordination between the two demons, and may not be useful for riskaverse decision makers who strongly believe that the attackers are cooperative. These decision makers normally consider the worst-case situation to make the most risk-averse decision. To avoid suboptimal results, one should try more different initial solutions to obtain different solutions and pick the solution with the largest payoff.
Alternatively, one can develop a bi-level model which aims at finding the most risk-averse solution or maximizing the payoff to each demon or attacker. This is left to future research.
To generate route flows, the developed route-flow extraction algorithm together with the alphabetical-order link-selection rule are adopted. This algorithm was written in Fortran and used to generate routes for class-1 hazmats between OD pair (1,3) when M = 3. This sub-problem has 11 links (i.e., 11 link flow variables) and 8 nodes, and could be solved in less than 0.001 second by a Laptop with Window 7 Professional, 8.00 GB RAM, and an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 2640M-M CPU@ 2.80 GHz. The procedure is illustrated in Figure 3 . The thickened arrows represent the route considered in each iteration. The number next to each link is the corresponding link flows. As we can see, for each iteration, one route is built. The route flow is the minimum of all link flows on this route. The link flows are updated by subtracting the route flow from them. Consequently, in the following iteration, at least one link is removed from consideration. In this example, four iterations are required and four routes are generated. The results are summarized in Table 4 .
According to Table 4 , one can see that the route flows satisfy the optimality conditions (13)-(15). Moreover, one link on each route is selected by a demon (Its link number is in bold face). If these links were removed, the subgraph for class-1 hazmats would be disconnected. These imply that the links selected by demons form a cut set for at least one type of hazmats transported between one OD pair, in which a cut set is a set of links whose deletion would be sufficient to disconnect the origin from the destination in a strongly connected network.
In fact, more than one link on a route can be selected by demons.  of all links on this route to be zero. If there were such a route, all dispatchers would select that route because there would be no people affected in the event of an incident along that route.
The travel links on different routes can correspond to the same set of links in the base network. For instance, the travel links on routes 1 and 3 correspond to links 1 and 2 in the base network. However, the links selected by a demon on these routes can be different (Szeto, 2013) . This can occur because the number of people affected along these routes depends on time of day, which is related to departure time. This implies that the potential location of an incident on a route depends on departure time. In this section, we actually solved the mixed system of equations and inequalities (1)- (10), (18)- (23) (10), (18)- (23) are also discussed.
Specification for the Link-based Mixed System of Equations and Inequalities
Among our formulations, we chose to solve the link-based mixed system of equations and inequalities (1)- (10), (18)- (23) 
Test Instances and Computational Speed
To To ensure that all demons did not attack to the same link (to give the worst-case situation), we added a set of quadratic conditions for any combination of two demons (whenever the number of demons is equal to or more than two) to the models. For example, for two demon cases, we added such a set of conditions: If we used only one starting point in the "Global solver" option of LINGO and also one strategy among all nonlinear solver strategies, for most of the test instances, the model was solved in less than a minute. In the worst case where a wider area of solutions was searched, it took no more than 207 seconds. Because the link-based model is highly nonlinear for large, realistic problems in general and the functions involved in the system may not be convex, all nonlinear solver strategies such as successive linear programming (SLP) direction, steepest edge, etc. in LINGO were checked. For models with alternative solutions (i.e., multiple solutions), we used the "Multi-start" option in the "Global solver" option of LINGO to search for more than one solution. When using this option with less than 10 different initial solutions, we could normally find at least one solution; otherwise, the local search procedure might not be able to find a solution. The run time linearly increases with either the number of starting points in the "Global solver" or the number of nonlinear solver strategies. For example, if we use 10 starting points and two nonlinear solve strategies, then the run time will be 10×2=20 times longer. Pay attention that these problems may have more than one solution with the same payoff and changing the starting points and strategies may help us find alternative solutions.
Observations and Insights
Based on the test instances in the previous section, we have the following observations and insights.
 In order to have the safest shipment of one type of hazmat, different trucks carrying the same type of hazmat need to take different routes and links. This can spread the risks.
 In case of multiple hazmat transportation, it is recommended to use different routes and links for different hazmat types to avoid having large route and link flows and consequently a high chance of accidents, injuries, and fatalities. Of course, this may increase travel time but can result in safer shipment.
 There is no need to split a long time horizon (e.g., day) to many smaller periods. The number of periods required depends on the number of major changes in population density over the time horizon. For example, in urban areas, the time horizon can be divided into three periods: morning peak hours, off-peak hours, and evening peak hours. Splitting the day to more periods will not introduce us safer routes but will increase computational efforts drastically.
 Computational time is highly dependent on the number of demons because the more number of demons generate more number of link attack scenarios.
 If the degree of connectivity in the transportation network is high (i.e., any node is accessible from other nodes through many routes), the shipment company may have multiple solutions.
 Hazmat shipments must pass through the critical links whose removal would make the network disconnected.
In this case, the flows on the critical links must be distributed or scheduled over different periods to have safer shipment. Therefore, during each period, each carrier needs to wait before using each of the critical links until the next period unless the previously scheduled carrier passes through it.
CASE STUDY
To illustrate our methodology for solving a practical hazmat routing and scheduling problem, we present a Singapore case study. The details are given in sections 7.1-7.3.
Methodology and Practical Aspects
Figure 4 illustrates our proposed methodology. It shows how our proposed models (e.g., NCP and VIP models) and solution methodology are linked to public policy decision making. The methodology is applicable to urban areas where hazmat trucks always avoid passing through congested residential areas. Before we apply the models, we need to observe regulations and use only approved routes. However, the proposed methodology does not have any specific restriction in applications.
Network and Demand Setting
For the ease of illustration, in this case study, we consider two hazmat classes which correspond to two groups of hazmats regulated by Singapore Civil Defense Force (SCDF) (SCDF, 2011), namely:
 Petroleum (which can further be divided into three subclasses with respect to flash points) and . We consider the base network similar to the one in Meng et al. (2005) . However, because we aim to investigate a hazmat shipment problem with more than one OD pair, we consider two OD pairs instead of one. Moreover, both classes of hazmats are transported between each of the two OD pairs. To illustrate the time-varying nature of the population, we consider two periods with different populations around the roads. The approved daily transportation time horizon in accordance to various government agencies in Singapore (especially SCDF) is 07:00-19:00 daily. We thus consider two representative one-hour periods: 7:00-8:00 and 9:00-10:00. Since in Singapore, working time span is 8:30-18:00, it is reasonable to assume that during the first period, the majority of residents stay at home. For the second period, we need to know about the number of employees from their home to work in other districts. To estimate this number, we solved a trip distribution problem using the well-known gravity model assigning higher weights to areas which are closer to central business districts (CBD) 2 . The number of employees, green areas, and the type of buildings in residential areas were embedded in our calculation. The gravity model calculations were coded and run using MATLAB. The distance
, is assumed to be the Minkowski distance of order b, which is defined as follows (Uster and Love, 2003) :
The most popular values for b are b = 1, 2, and b = ∞. For rectilinear distance, b = 1, which is suitable to be applied to internal transportation in production facilities. For Euclidean distance, b = 2, which is appropriate to be applied to sea and air transportation and transportation in desert, during which there are not many physical obstacles. For urban areas, the aisle distance measure is more realistic but it cannot be measured based on the coordinates of origin and destination (Drezner & Wesolowsky, 2001) . In urban areas, we mostly face the shipment situations where the travel distances can sometimes be best represented by Euclidean distance (b=2) and sometimes be best represented rectilinear distance (b=1). Therefore, in this research, we assume b=1.5 for our case problem, which is in an urban city.
Since we intend to test our algorithm on an acyclic network, we converted the road network to an acyclic network with one-way links only. To have a reasonable network and consider shortest travel distance in addition to population exposure, we used the Dijkstra algorithm. Through this shortest route algorithm and setting node 1 as an origin, we found a directed spanning tree 3 covering all 22 nodes and changed the existing 21 edges to 21 directed links. We identified the direction for the rest of the links (which are not in the directed tree) randomly. The resulted network can be transformed to the STEN (see Figure 5 ) with two OD pairs, namely, OD pairs (1,21) and (3, 22) . In Figure 5 , for the ease of illustration and clarity, we have not drawn waiting links due to having many arcs in the resultant network; these links are directed from a node on the left side of the network to its corresponding node on the right side. In summary, the STEN considers two periods, and has 48 nodes (including 44 normal nodes, 2 dummy origins, and 2 dummy destinations), 92 links (including 58 travel links, 24 waiting links, and 8 links connecting to dummy origins/destinations to the network). We set demands between OD pairs as 
For class-1 hazmats, we consider the lowest flash point. Therefore, we set its evacuation distance equal to 1600 meters (Verter and Kara, 2008) . For class-2 hazmats, the impact zone is assumed to be 800 meters in all directions (Meng et al., 2005) . In other words, total population exposed for class-1 hazmats is four times bigger than that for class-2 hazmats. Table 5 shows the data extracted from Singapore hazmat routes and the loss associated with each hazmat type for each district. For all waiting links, we used an arbitrary number (here 90000) as the loss. In fact, this number can be interpreted as the time average between losses at a particular location. Using the same loss for all waiting links allow us to reduce the direct impacts of waiting links on shifting traffic from the first period to the second period and this helps us to better analyze the results.
Analysis, Results, and Discussion
To solve the case study problem, we used the link-based model with the same software and hardware mentioned in section 6, the "Multi-start" option, and different nonlinear strategies for one and two demons (i.e., M = 1, 2). For M = 1 and M = 2, the solver found at least one solution in 1209.65 and 2685.36 seconds, respectively. The elapsed times are quite reasonable for such an operational/tactical decision problem. For M = 1, the demon attacks link (17
, 22 2 ) with a probability of one. The answer is rational because (17, 22) is a critical link 4 in the original graph (not in the STEN) and it is chosen by two out of four dispatchers heading to destination 22 and the demon gets some certain payoff by attacking this link. 2 ) with a probability of one. Rarely is a link being attacked with a probability 1. In the case study problem, there are a few critical links including link (17 2 , 22
2 ). When a critical link is definitely chosen by all dispatchers and is in a populated area, there must be a payoff to a demon if the link is targeted, and therefore it must be attacked by the demon. Because one demon has already attacked the critical link (17   2   , 22 2 ), the other demon attacks other links to maximize the payoff. However, both demons get an equal payoff, which confirms proposition 1, but the four dispatchers choose different routes and have different minimum expected losses. For dispatchers, the flows split in both periods but the flow is higher in the second period because in all of the links, loss in the first period is higher than that in the second. We need to pay attention that in the loss calculation, we used the concept of CBD but in fact the three CBDs in Singapore are not next to the approved hazmat routes. This is reasonable because the CBD is the most congested area of city and it attracts much trip generated by other districts during working hours. demons on the total expected loss, the effect of route sets on the lowest expected loss, and the existence of multiple link flows, link selection probabilities, and maximum expected payoffs. The computational efficiency of the solution strategy is also demonstrated and problem insights are discussed. A Singapore case study is presented to illustrate our methodology for solving a practical hazmat routing and scheduling problem.
Like all research activities, there are limitations and assumptions in our research that can lead us toward future research directions. First, the input road network in our problem is formed by unidirectional (one way) links but in reality, the network is formed by a combination of one-way and two-way links. Of course, it is very likely that solutions are mainly based on one-way links but the input can also be two-way. The proposed methodology will be extended to handle two-way links in the future. Second, using the concept of minimum spanning tree, we consider travel time in the network prior to solving the hazmat routing-scheduling problem. This hierarchical decision is practical but from the perspective of optimization, it is not as good as concurrent decision making. Moreover, using models in which travel time and hazmat routing-scheduling decision are being considered simultaneously may reduce loss for shipping companies. Given that cost saving is not the first objective compared to hazmat risks, we may use bi-level programming or multi-objective decision making techniques like the lexicographic one to extend our methodology to handle travel time in the future research. Third, while probabilistic concepts are exploited in this research in great detail, the main parameters in the research are deterministic. Considering uncertainty in parameters and also using relevant techniques such as robust optimization can be another future research direction.
Fourth, the number of demons used can be set as the mean or maximum historical number of hazmat incidents occurred simultaneously. Which is a better choice? Should we consider other factors simultaneously? These questions lead to one future research direction. Fifth, several OD pairs can belong to a certain private company or a regional authority in reality. For this case, we can consider the "company" or "regional authority" as a player in the dispatcher subproblem who can make the routing decisions of all trucks between those OD pairs in the STEN; we can define the expected loss to the player based on the total expected loss of those OD pairs (i.e., sum of expected loss of all paths on these OD pairs) to cater the cooperation between OD pairs, and define the KKT condition based on the marginal cost concept as in classic system optimum traffic assignment. Our framework can be easily extended to cater this case. This can be left to future studies. Finally, when it comes to applications, there is an analogy between the concept of our demon approach and terrorist attack; the demon approach can be used in dealing with man-made disasters. Manmade disasters can be divided into human errors (like in our hazmat problem) and terrorist attacks that are being done intentionally using human intelligence. In fact, in dealing with terrorist attacks, we need to focus on system resiliency based on the worst-case situation. An extension of our demon approach to terrorist attacks can be another interesting research on network routing and scheduling.
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